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The far-flung overseas deployment of troops is one of the central charges laid against the 
United States by those critics who accuse the US of being a ‘new empire’.  But while the US 
may be a global hegemon, it is far from being the only country to deploy troops on a global 
scale.  Consider the developing world’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.  UN 
data show that the number of contributors to peacekeeping has exploded from the Cold War 
figure of twenty six to 100 as of mid-2004, the overwhelming majority of them developing 
countries. So how are we to conceptualise such a significant deployment of peacekeepers 
from the developing world, in a unipolar international order?  I broach this question by 
scrutinising a nascent trend of critical theoretical scholarship in ‘peace operations theory’ – 
the ‘next stage’ literature.  Advancing a ‘subaltern realist’ perspective (Ayoob, 1997), in this 
dissertation I shall argue that since the end of the Cold War, the advance of the notion of 
‘sovereignty as responsibility’ has increasingly called the legitimacy of the non-Western state 
into question.  This political pressure has consequently compelled developing countries into 
demonstrating their ability to project the coercive power of the state across borders. This trend 
has, in turn, reinforced the militarisation of post Cold War international relations – a trend 
from which developing countries can only stand to lose in the long-term.  This dissertation 
should be seen as taking a step towards our ability to theorise the diversification of 
peacekeeping contribution, and through this, the broader practices of cross-border 
interventions in contemporary world politics. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Darfur: Restoring the Legitimacy of Intervention in World Politics 
 
The unfolding crisis in the western Sudanese province of Darfur provides a tragic occasion on 
which to observe how practices of cross-border military intervention in world politics have 
been affected by the international acrimony over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.     
Given the political and diplomatic fissures opened up by the war in Iraq, it is striking how 
rapidly a consensus has asserted itself across the political spectrum over the necessity of 
intervention in Sudan.  Consider the British press.  Writing in the Guardian under the 
headline ‘Enough imperial crusades’,1 post-structuralist thinker Peter Hallward casts a 
sceptical eye over the claims of defending the Sudanese refugees’ human rights, noting that 
Sudan was colonised in the nineteenth century under the moral banner of the ‘war against 
slavery’.  Faced with this legacy of Western intervention however, Hallward’s solution to 
Sudan’s ills is ‘certainly not passive resignation’.  Instead, Hallward advocates ‘fund[ing] the 
immediate and forceful deployment of African [Union] peacekeepers’, parallel to the Western 
promotion of the African Union (AU), to enable it to become ‘an effective and independent 
political actor, capable of brokering equitable political solutions to the long-standing conflicts 
that western intervention, almost always, has only helped provoke.’   
 
In contrast to Hallward, the Conservative Party’s shadow foreign secretary, Michael Ancram 
insinuates in the Daily Telegraph that it was decolonisation rather than colonialism that is the 
historical source of Sudan’s problems.2   But Ancram, too, is unambiguous on the solution in 
the present: ‘an effective international peacekeeping military force … preferably African and 
controlled by the African Union, should be prepared … [Britain] and other G8 countries 
should provide funding, communications and logistical support … The [peacekeepers’] 
mandate must be robust and unequivocal.’  These sentiments are echoed in most major 
newspapers throughout the Western world: ‘The only dim light in this gloomy picture is the 
… AU ... It has dispatched 150 (soon to be 300) troops to the region ... and offered to send 
thousands more …’ noted the Washington Post. 3  South Africa’s Cape Times also considered 
the AU troop deployments a ‘promising development’.4  
                           
1 Guardian, 18 August 2004 
2 ‘Last year’, Ancram writes, ‘I was verbally assailed by a southern Sudanese in the bombed-out ruins of Rumbek, the capital of 
the south, for the “mess you left behind in 1956 which has led to all this”. (That year, Sudan, which had been under Anglo-
Egyptian control since 1899, proclaimed itself an independent republic.)’ ‘While Darfur suffered, Blair’s government went on 
holiday’, 30 August 2004. 
3Cited in ‘The West must reassert pressure’ Guardian 25 August 2004  
4 ‘Pressure needs to be put on the rebels’ Guardian 10 August 2004  
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If, as the New York Times would have it, ‘[t]he war in Iraq has hopelessly muddied the waters 
on the legitimacy of intervention,’5 then judging by Darfur it seems that it has not thrown the 
question of the forcefulness of military intervention, nor indeed the fundamental legitimacy 
of military intervention itself, into doubt.  Rather the post-Iraq question-mark is over who is 
doing the intervening.  The deployment of UN-authorised African peacekeepers within Africa 
has been gathering pace for some time.  As far back as November 1992, the UN Security 
Council retroactively authorised the intervention of Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces in to 
Liberia.6  In February 2004, AU ministers met to elect the fifteen members of the newly 
established AU ‘Security Council’.7  But what is of particular interest as regards the current 
crisis in Sudan is the fact that, across the political spectrum and throughout the world, 
African peacekeepers are being seen as necessary to restore legitimacy to the practice of 
intervention in world politics.  
 
Taking the issue up on Peter Hallward’s terms, what is it then that distinguishes a ‘forceful’ 
and legitimate military intervention from the crude exercise of imperial power?  Is it only the 
skin colour of the intervening troops that distinguishes a ‘forceful’ intervention – with 
Western diplomatic, financial, and military support – from an Anglo-American ‘imperial 
crusade’?  Or is that interventions conducted by ‘indigenous’ forces are inherently more 
legitimate than interventions directly conducted by the great powers?  How are we to 
conceptualise the deployment of African and other peacekeepers from the developing world, 
in an international order so clearly dominated by US power?  These are some of the questions 
that I hope to broach and explore in this dissertation.   
 
Historical Perspective: Cross-border troop deployments by developing 
countries in the post Cold War era 
 
The US-led invasion of Iraq seems to have virtually institutionalised a new sub-discipline 
within International Relations (IR) – appropriately dubbed ‘American Empire studies’ by 
former Clinton administration official James Rubin.8  One distinct strand of this new ‘sub-
discipline’ focuses in particular on US troop deployments across the globe.  Chalmers 
Johnson, for example, author of The Sorrows of Empire (2004), argues that the diffuse US 
‘empire of bases’ is the foundation of US global hegemony.9   
 
                           
5 ‘Press Concern at Darfur Talks collapse’ BBC News, 19 July 2004.   
6 ‘ECOMOG’ is the ‘Cease-fire Monitoring Group’ of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
7 ‘How to put the House in Order’ Economist 11 March 2004 
8 ‘Base motives’, Guardian, 8 May 2004. 
9 ‘[T]he Pentagon currently owns or rents 702 overseas bases in about 130 countries […] The real reason for … this … ring of 
American bases … is to expand our empire and reinforce our military domination of the world’.  Chalmers Johnson, ‘America’s 
Empire of Bases’, 15 January 2004.  Accessed at <http://www.commondreams.org.views04/0115-08.htm> 
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But the US is far from being the only country to deploy its forces globally.  Consider 
developing countries’ military deployments through the UN.  According to the latest 
available data (July 2004), of the 58,756 UN peacekeepers10 deployed worldwide, 
approximately ninety three per cent (or 54,440 peacekeepers) are contributed from eighty two 
developing countries.  The top ten contributors, who supply sixty two percent of the total (or 
36,561 peacekeepers between them), are all developing countries.  Nor do these figures 
include developing country contributions to non-UN operations, such as those conducted by 
ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  Even peacekeeping 
operations11 conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – an alliance 
dominated by developed countries – encompasses developing country contributions from 
non-NATO, non-Partnership for Peace states as far afield as Argentina and Morocco.12   
 
The diversification of peacekeeping contributors to both UN and non-UN operations began 
with the end of the Cold War.  The end of the Cold War corresponded with a frenetic 
proliferation of UN peacekeeping operations: the 1988-1993 period saw twenty new 
peacekeeping missions established – more than all the UN operations undertaken in the 
previous forty years (Bellamy et al., 2004:75).  As UN operations expanded, so too did the 
organisation’s appetite for manpower – an appetite that was at least partially met by a 
dramatic diversification of peacekeeping contributors.  The number of peacekeeping 
contributors exploded from the Cold War figure of twenty six contributing nations to seventy-
six in 1994 – forty one of whom had never previously participated in such operations 
(Findlay, 1996:2).  In the same period, another twenty-one states became first-time 
participants in peacekeeping operations beyond the UN aegis.13  Bobrow and Boyer (1997) 
further observe that while there were thirty two ‘activist’ contributors to peacekeeping during 
the 1945-1988 period, the figure for the 1988-1996 period is over double the Cold War 
figure, standing at forty four ‘activist’ contributors (‘activist’ defined as involvement in 
twenty percent or more of peacekeeping cases, in at least one period [1997:731]).   Given that 
the overwhelming majority of the world’s states are developing countries, it is inevitable that 
such a dramatic and sustained diversification of peacekeeping contributors has drawn in so 
many developing states.   
                           
10 Throughout the dissertation, unless specified otherwise, I will operate with the UN definition of ‘peacekeepers’ as being either 
military troops, military observers and / or civilian police.  See the Monthly Summary of Military and Civilian Police 
Contribution to United Nations Operations, made available online by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations: 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors> (hence forward the ‘UN Monthly Summary’).   
11 The definition of ‘peacekeeping’ is a slippery issue that will be elaborated upon below in Chapter 2.  Broadly speaking 
however, unless otherwise specified I will adopt Andersson’s definition of peacekeeping: ‘A UN authorised intervention 
conducted by military means under the auspices of the UN itself, a state, states or international organisations and in which there 
is no designated enemy.’  (Andersson, 2000:4) 
12 See the ‘Stabilisation Force’ section of the NATO website: <http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/sfororg.htm> 
13 Specifically, in the 1994 US-led multinational force in Haiti, and various OSCE, ECOWAS and CIS peacekeeping 
deployments (Findlay, 1996:6).   
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What is striking about this diversification of peacekeeping contributors is how enduring it has 
been beneath the ebb and flow of peacekeeping in the post Cold War era.  Thus, while the 
numbers of UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide have fluctuated since the end of the Cold 
War, and while the contribution rankings have shuffled over the years,14 the overall diversity 
of contributors to peacekeeping has remained at a persistently higher level than during the 
Cold War.  For example, in 1993, over 70,000 UN peacekeepers were deployed globally.  But 
following the deaths of US troops in Somalia in 1993, and the widely-perceived failure of the 
UN to halt atrocities in the Rwandan and Bosnian civil wars in 1994, the number of UN 
peacekeepers dropped to 20,000 in 1996 (Bellamy et al., 2004:84).  Yet the number of states 
contributing to peacekeeping operations in April 1997 (seventy one) was still not let less than 
the number of contributors as of 1993 (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997:731).   
 
Bellamy et al. (2004) argue that the UN’s ‘retreat from peacekeeping’ in the 1996-1999 
period was as dramatic as the transformation of peacekeeping in the 1988-1993 period 
(2004:84).  Given that the post Cold War diversification of peacekeeping contributors 
weathered the hiatus period in UN peacekeeping of the mid-1990s, this suggests that the 
diversification of contributors is largely independent of both the political perceptions of UN 
peacekeeping in the post Cold War era, and the variability in the UN’s appetite for 
manpower.  By focusing on the diversity of peacekeeping contribution, we see an underlying 
continuity to the role of peacekeeping in post Cold War international society, that otherwise 
might escape us were we to concentrate on the surface flux of UN operations alone.  
   
The latest available data show that there are currently 100 contributors to UN peacekeeping 
operations.15  In other words, over half of the world’s states are currently contributing either 
military or police forces to operations abroad – in UN peacekeeping operations alone.16  If 
we disaggregate the developing world’s vast contribution to peacekeeping operations, we 
immediately see enormous variety between individual states’ contributions.  These range 
from providing the core of major UN operations (e.g., Pakistan’s 3,854-strong contribution to 
the 9,831-strong UNAMSIL operation in Sierra Leone)17 to purely tokenistic contributions, 
such as a solitary Chinese policeman seconded to the UN-authorised, NATO-led International 
                           
14 During mid-1994, for example, France and Britain ranked as the second and fourth largest contributing nations, respectively.  
Others among the ‘top ten’ contributors included Pakistan, India, Jordan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Egypt (Risse-Kappen, 
1997:272). 
15 See the UN Monthly Summary.    
16 William Durch estimates that there were 50,000 troops deployed in non-UN peacekeeping operations at the end of 2002 
(Durch, in Bellamy and Williams, 2004b:183) 
17 See the UN Monthly Summary.  
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Stability Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.18  Such variety between various states’ 
contributions poses significant difficulties for analysts seeking to assess how the burden of 
contribution is distributed among states.19  Similarly, in terms of operational efficacy, 
doubtless the developing world’s contribution spans the gamut of military utility.  Under-
equipped personnel from developing countries are allegedly often the bane of UN 
peacekeeping, with the necessary logistics and equipment most often supplied by developed 
countries (Bellamy et al., 2004:52).          
 
Research Question and Methodology 
 
But it is more the international, political aspects of the generalised diversification of 
contributors to post Cold War peacekeeping that concerns us here, rather than the institutional 
details of particular peacekeeping operations, or the differences between particular states’ 
contributions.  From this viewpoint, China’s symbolic one-man contribution to a NATO-led 
force in a country bordering the People’s Republic may be just as intriguing and revealing as 
Pakistan’s major troop deployment to an operation as far from Pakistan’s borders as 
UNAMSIL.  That is to say, the key question concerning us here is: does the quantitative 
diversification in peacekeeping contributors, that has drawn in so many developing countries, 
signal any broader qualitative change in the fabric of international politics; and if so, what 
kind of a change?   
 
This dissertation should thus be understood as taking a step towards our ability to theorise the 
diversification of peacekeeping contribution, and through this, the broader practices of cross-
border interventions in contemporary world politics.  No attempts have been made in the 
course of this dissertation to conduct a program of original fieldwork, nor to empirically test 
the claims advanced below, through, for example, a systematic case-study investigation based 
on secondary literature.  Specific instances, historical and contemporary, of peacekeeping 
contribution will be alighted on throughout the text, though not in any systematic manner.  
Rather my engagement with empirical examples will be characterised, in the words of Hedley 
Bull, ‘by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgement’.  Consequently any ‘general 
propositions’ thereby generated ‘cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative and 
inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin’ (Bull, 1966: 361).   
 
                           
18 BBC News, 12 January 2004 
19 As Andersson notes, ‘it is unreasonable to imply that a state participating in 15 operations, sending two observers to each, is a 
greater participant than a state participating in 10 operations and sending an average of 1,000 troops to each’ (2000:7).   
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This is not to take an epistemological position that denies the value of rigorous empirical 
research and case study analysis.  The omission of any systematic empirical analysis in this 
dissertation has been partly dictated by the constraints of time and space, and partly by the 
lack of a sufficiently large body of secondary literature on individual countries’ peacekeeping 
contributions, that could be used to sustain systematic comparison across cases.  Without 
rehearsing the musty methodological debates of the clash of the ‘behaviouralist’ and 
‘classical’ schools, the international society approach has been chosen as the most 
appropriate, because the diffuse elements that this approach strives to capture – questions of 
international norms and legitimacy – are precisely what is lacking from the extant literature 
on peacekeeping contribution.  In addressing this omission, the framework constructed below 
is trying to grasp what Bull termed the ‘play of international politics’ (Bull, 1966:368), the 
‘quality it has of changing before our eyes and slipping between our fingers even as we try to 
categorise it’ – in other words, that putative qualitative transformation in international society 
that has corresponded with the diversification of peacekeeping contributors.  By retaining this 
grasp of the dynamic and multifaceted nature of international politics, I hope to maintain an 
interpretive, humanist emphasis, that allows us, in Robert Jackson’s words, to gain ‘insight 
into the mentality of the [states]people involved and the circumstances in which they find 
themselves’ (2003:71).  Thus the overall aim of this dissertation is to explore rather than to 
test, and to provide a basis for further research and discussion, rather than any robust 
empirical findings.  The focus throughout the text will be on UN peacekeeping operations – 
partly because there is more literature on UN peacekeeping, but also because as Bellamy et 
al. observe  ‘[a]lthough peacekeeping is an activity undertaken by many different actors, its 
history and development is intimately tied to the UN.  Indeed, peacekeeping is often seen as 
synonymous with UN operations.’ (2004:45) 
  
Throughout my research, a number of discrete bodies of literature have been engaged with – 
including the self-styled ‘Next Stage’ in ‘peace operations theory’, writings on humanitarian 
intervention and the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, security studies literature, and the 
literature on peacekeeping contribution.  It is partly the paucity of the literature devoted to 
analysing peacekeeping contribution that has necessitated these forays into other spheres of 
thought in IR.  None of these bodies of literature have, alas, been dealt with in anything 
approximating an exhaustive or comprehensive manner.  And indeed there are other spheres 
of literature – notably constructivist analyses of the ‘national interest’ – that could be 
fruitfully engaged with to enrich the theoretical framework constructed below.  Nonetheless, 
it is hoped that through probing the limits of these aforementioned writings, and through 
synthesising their various insights, a wide-ranging, but neither disjointed nor eclectic 
discussion of developing country contribution to peacekeeping operations has been created.     
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I have chosen to import a term from the field of security studies to describe the position being 
advanced in this dissertation; namely ‘subaltern realism’ – a combination originally 
formulated by Mohammed Ayoob (1997).  Ayoob combines the Gramscian-inspired term 
‘subaltern’ with the central precept of IR orthodoxy ‘realism’, to designate an approach to 
international politics that is simultaneously state- and power-centric (‘realist’) and focused on 
the concerns and circumstances of the majority of states – the developing countries, those that 
are ‘less powerful, and, therefore, of “inferior rank”, to quote the dictionary definition of 
subaltern’ (Ayoob, 1997:141).  In this dissertation, I will expand on Ayoob’s designation 
‘subaltern realism’ to further encompass a firmly egalitarian approach to international society 
that emphasises the necessity of formal sovereign equality as the organising principle of 
international relations.  
 
Aims and Outline 
 
The argument proceeds as follows.  In the next chapter, I begin by providing a critical 
overview of the extant literature on contribution to peacekeeping.  As shall become clear 
below, the major flaws of the extant literature are threefold: its frequently instrumental bent, 
its failure to properly integrate the international realm as a distinct sphere into its analysis, 
and its failure to explore how contribution to peacekeeping relates to the wider role of 
peacekeeping in global politics.  In the third chapter, I move to contrast the limitations of this 
literature with the perspective provided in the nascent ‘Next Stage’ scholarship in ‘peace 
operations theory’.  The critical theoretical ‘Next Stage’ literature supplies a powerful 
critique of the positivistic preoccupations and oftentimes sterile debates that have hitherto 
marred the study of peacekeeping.  In advancing this critique, ‘Next Stage’ scholarship has 
explicitly sought to follow the methodological injunction of peacekeeping scholar Alan 
James, who has argued that the study of peacekeeping must begin by placing it ‘firmly in the 
context of international politics’ (James, in Bellamy, 2004:17).  As the ‘Next Stage’ school 
has sought to diversify peacekeeping studies beyond its fixation with arid taxonomy and 
myopic analysis of peacekeeping operations themselves, it provides an invaluable point of 
departure for thinking about how the more extensive processes of global politics relate to 
states’ contribution to peacekeeping.  However, while I welcome the ‘Next Stage’ literature 
for having reinvigorated scholarly analysis of peacekeeping, I also hope to deploy a 
‘subaltern realist’ perspective to broach the limits of its critical theoretical method.     
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Having introduced the ‘Next Stage’ school, I then set up what I take to be its account of the 
role of peacekeeping in global politics – which I characterise as the ‘global riot control’ 
thesis.  In brief, this thesis – chiefly represented by Michael Pugh’s (2004) work – draws on 
the political economy writings of Robert Cox and Mark Duffield to posit peacekeeping as the 
military containment of social instability in peripheral areas of the world economy (‘global 
riots’), that are fostered by the structural contradictions of global capitalism.  This thesis has 
the intellectual benefits of both parsimony and elegance.  However, I shall argue that while 
the ‘global riot control’ thesis is capable of grasping the military domination of peoples in the 
developing world, its world-systems-style analytical grid of ‘core’ versus ‘periphery’ crushes 
inter-state relations out of the analysis.  Thus while it is capable of grasping the structural 
inequalities and economic inequities of the world order, the ‘global riot control’ thesis, and 
more broadly the ‘Next Stage’ school as a whole, is less capable of comprehending relations 
of inter-state domination.  It is here that a ‘subaltern realist’, international society approach 
provides a necessary shift in focus.   
 
My rejoinder to both the ‘Next Stage’ and the contribution literature is provided in the fourth 
chapter, where I analyse the impact of the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ on 
developing states.  ‘Sovereignty as responsibility’ contends that an international consensus 
has solidified over the last decade that states are morally responsible for the preservation of 
minimum standards of human rights, both within and across state borders.  I shall 
problematise this argument on the grounds that it obscures the shift in global power relations 
that has taken place in the post Cold War era.  Drawing principally on the work of David 
Chandler (2002) and utilising the schema provided by Martin Wight in his celebrated 1966 
essay ‘Why is there no International Theory?’ I shall argue that the end of the Cold War has 
witnessed a ‘re-enchantment of the international’.   
 
Schematically put, the ‘re-enchantment of the international’ holds that with the dissolution of 
the USSR, the international realm has become more penetrable to Western power.  
Confronted with an ostensibly more pliant international realm, and with colossal economic 
and military resources at their disposal, Western state elites have been increasingly enticed 
into using the international realm as a haven from which they can transcend the outmoded 
programmes of traditional party politics, and project socially-cohering values in response to 
the atomisation of traditional political constituencies of left and right.  This is the impulse, I 
argue, underlying Western states’ elevation of individual human rights over the rights of 
states.  As the content of human rights is frequently established independently of the subjects 
of those rights, the broadening and deepening of the international framework of human rights 
has facilitated the extension of Western power over the developing world.  With the 
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simultaneous demise of Soviet might and disenchantment of the domestic political sphere, the 
international realm no longer appears as the grim realm of ‘recurrence and repetition’, in 
Martin Wight’s words, but rather offers tantalising transformative possibilities to transcend 
political malaise within the West – hence ‘re-enchantment of the international’.   
 
In as far as the ‘re-enchantment of the international’ corresponds with enhanced prospects for 
the projection of Western power, so the international realm has become disenchanted and less 
malleable for developing countries.  From the subaltern realist perspective, the dissolution of 
Soviet power was concomitant with a significant restriction of developing countries’ 
possibilities for political and economic development independent of the Western orbit 
(Ayoob, 1995:passim).  I examine the decline of unilateral military interventions by 
developing countries, and argue that this shows the developing world is largely unable to act 
beyond the remit of Western power.  As Western states have sought to promote individual 
rights over the rights of states, this has entailed an externalisation of political accountability 
on the part of non-Western states.  As the consolidation of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ has 
morally charged the hitherto neutral criteria of statehood (Chandler, 2002:136), non-Western 
states are increasingly pressed into practical demonstrations of state power in support of 
human rights.  Thus it is the new world order, I argue, that has placed such a high political 
premium on the deployment of peacekeepers as a de facto criterion of ‘proper’ statehood.   
 
If the moral authority of statehood is now to be held to account to an ‘international 
community’ rather than a domestic populace, this entails a haemorrhaging of legitimacy from 
the developing state – a political depletion that can only further weaken and destabilise 
already fragile countries.  ‘Sovereignty as responsibility’, I argue, in the final analysis, entails 
sovereignty as irresponsibility to one’s own citizens.  Moreover, the extent to which the moral 
authority of statehood is increasingly associated with coercive power, so the tendency is to 
intensify economic, technological and political inequalities in world politics.  As the 
developing world’s odyssey in international politics has been defined by the struggle for 
equality (Ayoob, 1995) these are trends from which non-Western states can only lose out in 
the long run.   
 
Finally, a note on the title of the dissertation.  On 13 October 2003 Albanian television news 
broadcast part of the speech that Albanian defence minister Pandeli Majko gave to a seventy-
one strong detachment of Albanian ‘peacekeepers’ who had volunteered to be deployed to 
southern Iraq as part of the multinational Coalition forces stationed there.  The defence 
minister ‘stressed’ that in centuries past the ‘forefathers’ of these peacekeepers had once 
fought on those very same ‘plains of Karbala under the flag of a world empire’.  Should 
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anyone have misconstrued which ‘world empire’ the defence minister was referring to, Majko 
further clarified that ‘our sons now take the hymn of their service to freedom in the new 
Iraq’.20  Presumably then, the ‘world empire’ that Majko was referring to was indeed the 
Ottoman Empire, that ran from modern-day Albania to modern-day Iraq; and the military 
forebears of today’s Albanian peacekeepers presumably the Ottoman ‘janissaries’ (originally 
yeni-çeri, or ‘new soldiers’) – an elite caste of Ottoman slave-troops forcibly recruited from 
the Christian youth of the Ottomans’ Balkan domains.   
 
What made the plight of the janissaries poignant was the fact that they frequently returned to 
the Balkans as enforcers of the Sultan’s will over their own peoples.  By supplementing and 
supporting the predatory instincts of Western states, I am arguing that developing country 
peacekeepers serve as the West’s janissaries for the post Cold War world.  This is not to 
suggest that the ‘New World Order’ is a strategically-envisioned, monolithically-imposed 
‘world empire’ that can spontaneously call up Third World armies to do its bidding.  Rather, 
the point of the analogy is to underscore how, though their contribution to interventionist 
practices in world politics, the majority of the world’s states are serving to consolidate a 
world order detrimental to their own status.   
 
By contributing to interventionism – as manifested by the diversification of peacekeeping 
contributors – developing countries are helping to consolidate a world wherein the moral 
authority of statehood derives from the demonstration of coercive power in the international 
sphere.  Developing countries are thereby helping to establish a terrain on which they will 
always be of ‘inferior rank’.  For if the cross-border demonstration of coercive power in the 
service of human rights now serves as a trapping of legitimate statehood, whatever symbolic 
authority such militarism confers, it can ultimately offer no more guarantee against external 
domination than any other trapping of statehood – such as a national airline or set of postage 
stamps.  In the last instance, such a dubious criterion of ‘proper statehood’ is indicative of a 
world order where the strong – those most effective at projecting power across borders – can 
prey on the weak at will.    
 
 
 
 
 
                           
20 In South East Europe Security Monitor, 14 October 2003 (hence forward ‘SEES Monitor’).   
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2. TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR 
PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTION: 
Critical Literature Review 
 
 
What are the extant arguments that seek to explain or account for states’ contribution to 
international peacekeeping operations?  The first thing to note is that peacekeeping 
scholarship has largely focused its analytical energy on the dynamics of peacekeeping 
operations themselves, rather than on the anterior questions surrounding peacekeeping 
contributors.  Consequently, the literature frequently treats contributions to peacekeeping 
operations as if they were simply ‘inputs’ seamlessly supplied by an ‘external international 
community’ (Li, 2003:2).  If analysis of the issues surrounding contribution does take place, it 
is only rarely that ‘students of peace operations … raise their eyes much higher than the 
Security Council, whereas students of International Relations seldom question the impact that 
the practices of the states and international organisations they study has on the peace 
operations environment [and] the self-image of peacekeeping’ (Bellamy, 2004:18).    
 
Of the literature that there is, it can be divided into two spheres: one sphere offers a wide 
range of specific factors – mostly in the realpolitik vein – that could potentially explain a 
state’s contribution to a specific peacekeeping operation and / or peacekeeping operations in 
general.  The second sphere attempts to abstract from particular states’ ‘motives’ and foreign 
policy calculations, and suggest more general explanations underlying peacekeeping 
contribution. 
 
Specific Explanations 
 
In a 1996 SIPRI report Trevor Findlay presents a spectrum of possible ‘motives’ behind 
peacekeeping contribution, including: submission to diplomatic pressure; seeking to gain 
leverage in the UN; trading troops for hard-currency UN remuneration21 and / or the less 
tangible ‘rewards’ of amassing overseas experience and training; accumulating military 
equipment and technology by retaining the supplies provided; keeping the armed forces 
                           
21 The potential for peacekeeping operations to be profitable arises from the fact that since 1973 contributing governments are 
reimbursed at a flat rate for troop units supplied (Li, 2003:3).  This means that states that supply expensive military equipment 
may receive as a little as one quarter of their costs, while poor countries sending ill-equipped forces could receive as much as 3.5 
times their own expenditure (Durch, in Bellamy et al., 2004:52). 
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entangled in foreign operations rather than interfering in domestic politics; seeking to 
suppress the spread of regional instability; manoeuvring to secure a permanent seat on the 
Security Council in the expectation of post Cold War reform of the UN; as well as more 
abstract and ideational factors, such as the desire to demonstrate ‘good international 
citizenship’, seeking to garner international legitimacy, or contributing to peacekeeping as a 
component of a wider strategy of national integration in to international alliances and 
institutions (1996a:3-8). 
 
While all of these suggestions are perfectly plausible ‘no systematic evidence from the 
empirical record is offered’ (Andersson, 2000:3).  To be sure, some scholars have pursued 
some of these lines of inquiry in relation to specific countries,22 and a cursory examination of 
global media reports would provide strong, albeit anecdotal and unsystematic support for 
Findlay’s suggestions.23  But the fact remains that, in Andersson’s words, all such 
explanations offer little ‘viability in generalising across all states’ (2000:3), which is the one 
of the key aims of this dissertation.   
 
One of the more imaginative empirical investigations of peacekeeping contribution is Peter 
Jakobsen’s (1996) analysis, where he sets out to assess the relative importance of a variety of 
factors in triggering post Cold War UN Chapter VII operations;24 namely, ‘the national 
interest’; the ‘CNN-effect’; the existence of a clear-cut legal case of massive humanitarian 
suffering; the chances of success; and the degree of domestic support.  Jakobsen’s 
investigations of Chapter VII operations in Kuwait, northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda and 
Haiti, lead him to conclude that the role of the ‘national interest’, at least as classically 
conceived, is largely insignificant; that the ‘CNN effect’ is salient in so far as it places ‘a 
conflict on the agenda’ (1996:213), and that broad domestic support is not a necessary 
criterion for a Chapter VII operation (1996:205).          
 
Other analysts have tried to expand some of these specific factor explanations across states.    
Noting the association between the diversification of peacekeeping contribution and the 
widespread wave of post Cold War democratisation in the developing world, Velázquez 
(2002), for example, posits a ‘diversionary peace’ hypothesis: ‘in order to force potentially 
                           
22 For example, Norden (1995) has explored the domestic political motivations underpinning Argentinean contribution to 
peacekeeping., while Scobell (1995) and Berman and Sams (1998) (cited in Li, 2003) have explored the financial motivations 
underpinning Fijian and poor African states’ peacekeeping contributions, respectively.  
23 The BBC speculates, for example, that Ukraine is contributing over 1,000 troops to ‘stability operations’ in  Iraq in order to 
recompense the US after Washington accused Kiev of supplying a sophisticated aircraft detection system to Baghdad in 2002 
(BBC News, 7 August 2003).  BBC correspondent Mark Doyle also noted more recently that China’s largest ever contribution to 
a peacekeeping operation (a 500-strong deployment to the UNAMIL UN operation in Liberia earlier this year), followed the new 
UN-backed government’s withdrawal of diplomatic recognition from Taiwan in favour of Beijing (BBC News, 20 January 2004).   
24 Chapter VII is the chapter of the UN Charter that discusses coercive measures (either economic sanctions or military force) to 
deal with acts of aggression and ‘threats to international peace and security’.   
 16 
 
 
reluctant militaries to respect the legal framework, the civilian government can choose to 
deploy their armed forces far from the centre of political power … [B]y sending troops to far-
off destinations … the government can keep the army divided weak and relative to the 
civilian government’ (2002:3).  Velázquez suggests that this civil-military relations 
framework might apply to ‘states that are coping with the processes of democratic 
consolidation’ (ibid).  Andersson (2000) has performed a similar analysis in quantitative 
terms, corroborating a state’s contribution to peacekeeping with its degree of internal 
democracy.  Others (Blum, 2000) have sought to text the extent to which developing countries 
contribute to peacekeeping operations for pecuniary reward.   
 
Quite apart from the limited generalisability of such specific-factor explanations,25 a flaw 
common to such approaches is that they tend to pre-suppose precisely what needs to be 
explained, namely: why has international society come to attach some profound status to the 
practice of contribution to peacekeeping?  How does contribution to peacekeeping relate to 
the wider role of peacekeeping in global politics?  In the focus on how the internal 
arrangements of states – whether civil-military relations (Velázquez, 2002), or the degree of 
internal democracy (Andersson, 2000) – impacts on the international realm through 
contribution to peacekeeping, the international sphere is expunged from the analysis.   
 
Related to this flaw, and much like the wider field of peacekeeping studies as a whole, is the 
distinctly instrumental flavour of this mode of analysis.  That is to say, in corroborating a 
state’s degree of democracy with its peacekeeping contribution, Andersson’s driving concern 
is that ‘levels of participation not only determine whether peacekeeping operations occur at 
all, but also bring consequences for any future operation, including the prospect for stand-by 
arrangements and development of doctrine’ (2000:1).  This instrumentality is also evident in 
the ‘diversionary peace’ hypothesis: ‘lessons derived from Argentine and Brazilian 
peacekeepers may provide policy prescriptions to decision-makers interested in diversionary 
peace in the developing world’ (Velázquez, 2002:4).  As Bellamy et al. (2004:14) note, the 
policy-oriented, instrumental approach lends itself to taking peacekeeping as the self-evident 
starting point of analysis, rather than problematising peacekeeping, and trying to immerse it 
‘in the wider processes and structures of global politics’ and thereby retain a grasp of ‘the 
crucial point’: ‘decisions about when to intervene, how to intervene and what resources to 
                           
25 For example, it is highly unlikely that profiteering could be generalised across major contributors as an explanation for their 
peacekeeping contributions.  In India’s and Pakistan’s cases, for example, any ‘profits’ would be minimal relative to overall 
military expenditure (Li, 2003:3, see also Krishnasamy, 2002).  In the case of ‘diversionary peace’, Li (2003) observes that in 
some cases the terms may be reversed: it is arguable that participation in peacekeeping operations informed both the Ghanaian 
and Fijian military’s seizures of power (Scobell and Hutchful, in Li, 2003:5).   
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employ in that intervention are unavoidably political, complex, multidimensional and 
contested’ (Bellamy et al., 2004:32).       
 
General Explanations 
 
As Andersson argues, ‘integrated analysis of participation among states is a neglected 
dimension of peacekeeping’ (2000:1), and the ‘literature concerned with more abstract and 
general factors affecting a state’s propensity to participate’ (2000:3) could almost be counted 
on the fingers of one hand.  Both Neack (1995) and Bobrow and Boyer (1997) offer more-or-
less realist analyses of peacekeeping contribution, arguing that contribution can be theorised 
through a national interest in maintaining the stability of the international order.  While Neack 
presents this argument in more classical terms (great powers’ interests in maintaining the 
‘international status quo’), Bobrow and Boyer analyse peacekeeping as the provision of an 
‘international public good’ – security – by the great powers.  However, while Bobrow and 
Boyer recognise the post Cold War diversification of peacekeeping contribution, both theirs 
and Neack’s realist focus leads them to concentrate on peacekeeping contribution in relation 
to great power interests, detracting from the generalisability of this framework to the majority 
of states.   
 
While all three of these authors are keenly aware of the lack of theoretical generalisation in 
previous analysis, their own propositions are undermined by a number of methodological and 
theoretical failings.  In methodological terms for example, Neack relies predominantly on 
Cold War data, thereby sidelining the significant transformations in peacekeeping of the Cold 
War era (Andersson, 2000:3).  But the greatest failing of these realist explanations is their 
relative theoretical shallowness.  As Andersson observes (2000:19), realist analysis has 
difficulty reconciling the fact that the financial costs incurred by rich contributing states are 
usually high, certain and immediate.  By contrast, any realpolitik gains from peacekeeping 
operations are frequently uncertain, imprecise and in the distant future – hence it is unclear to 
what extent a sharply defined realpolitik calculus could lie behind every peacekeeping 
deployment.  Bobrow and Boyer’s (1997) largely quantitative analysis leads them to conclude 
that post Cold War peacekeeping has witnessed a diversification of both contributors and 
‘beneficiary states’.  But, as Li scathingly remarks, this ultimately yields little more insight 
than could be ‘gleaned from the UN’s public relations material’ (2003:n3).    
 
In terms of strengths, taken together the literature on peacekeeping contribution imparts some 
insights, and broadly serves the purpose of forcing peacekeeping scholarship to cast its net 
wider than the conduct of individual peacekeeping operations.  But, as Li concludes after 
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having surveyed the literature, ‘despite the fact that such work transcends the limitations of 
policy-oriented studies and genuinely seeks to place peacekeeping within the scope of 
mainstream international relations scholarship, [the studies] are mostly descriptive, based on 
questionable methodologies, and weak in overall analytical power – in other words, they do 
not move the discussion very far beyond the literature they critique’ (2003:3).   
 
More specifically, much like the literature that analyses contribution in specific terms, these 
general studies also share the flaw that they fail to consider the context of global politics, in 
which contribution to peacekeeping takes place.  Noting that public political discourses use 
peacekeeping to refer to a wide variety of operations and tasks, and that peacekeeping 
operations have changed over time, Bellamy et al. note the difficulty that analysts of 
peacekeeping have in trying to chronologically classify peacekeeping in to Cold War and post 
Cold War eras, by reference to the conduct of the operations themselves.  Bellamy et al. cite 
examples of the diversity of peacekeeping operations in the Cold War – specifically the 
singular UN ‘peace enforcement’ operation of the 1950-1953 Korean War, and the 1960-1964 
ONUC intervention in Congo – that confronted situations resembling those confronted by UN 
forces in Bosnia or Somalia (2004:76-92).  Similarly, Pakistan’s 1962-1963 UNTEA 
administration of West New Guinea, in advance of the colony’s transfer from Dutch to 
Indonesian sovereignty, foreshadows the UN’s assumption of plenary and administrative 
powers in the post Cold War era, such as the UNTAG (1989-1990) and UNTAC (1992-1993) 
operations in Namibia and Cambodia, respectively.   
 
The point is, again, following James, to place peacekeeping ‘firmly in the context of 
international politics’.  So, in the case of the Korean War, the balance of power within the UN 
as a whole enabled the US to use the UN essentially as a military alliance in pursuit of 
Washington’s objective of re-uniting the Korean peninsula by force.  The context for 
understanding ONUC and UNTEA is decolonisation – the process that presaged the 
democratisation of power in the UN, away from the Western states on the Permanent Security 
Council to those in the General Assembly.  The context of the ‘classic’ peacekeeping 
operation UNEF I (established to monitor Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire lines after the 1956 Suez 
War), was the diminished legitimacy attached to the use of Western power abroad.26   
 
 
 
                           
26 The then UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, had to reject a suggestion that British and French forces, who had 
colluded with the Israeli invasion, would become a UN force (Granatstein, in Neack, 1995: 189).     
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Similarly, the context for post Cold War peacekeeping is the era of the ‘New Interventionism’ 
(Chesterman, 2003), marked by the increasing proclivity to intervene on the part of Western 
states, the expanding role of the UN Security Council and broadening of the remit of the 
‘international peace and security’ concerns under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  As a 
species of outside intervention into a conflict, peacekeeping has to be considered alongside 
within this wider array of interventionist practices in the post Cold War era.  This is not say 
that the international order over-determines individual peacekeeping operations.  Bellamy et 
al. note that of the UN’s twenty new operations created from 1988 to 1993, fifteen were in the 
UNEF ‘traditional’ mode – that is, essentially an interpositionary role of supervising military 
withdrawals and / or monitoring ceasefire lines (2004:76).  But the fact remains that the 
‘starting point’ for the study of peacekeeping ‘should be an appreciation of its essentially 
contested nature and its underlying purposes rather than abstract ideas drawn in from conflict 
research or complex taxonomies derived from what peacekeepers do in the field’ (Bellamy et 
al., 2004:32).  We shall now move to consider one thesis that seeks to specifically 
contextualise the role played by ‘peace operations’ in the global order.        
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3. ‘GLOBAL RIOT CONTROL’: 
Critical Theory and Peacekeeping  
 
 
In commenting on Debrix’s poststructuralist analysis Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping (1999), 
Pugh notes the iconic role that the ubiquitous Blue Helmets have come to assume in the New 
World Order: ‘screens showing intervention forces standing around while refugees are 
pushing past or soldiers handing out rations in a disaster probably have a more important role 
in shaping perceptions than factors lacking in televisual appeal [e.g.,] [t]he terms of trade for 
agricultural exports’ (2003:109).  Yet the movement of peacekeeping ‘from the periphery of 
world politics to a central position did not seem to produce a comparable shift of explicit 
theorisation’ (Pugh, 2003:107).  Many scholars of peacekeeping27 have taken peacekeeping 
studies to task for its limited horizons – its descriptive and prescriptive, rather than analytical 
and theoretical focus; its preoccupation with operational inefficiencies, tactical considerations 
and mandate fulfilment; and a crippling fixation on barren typologies to categorise operations, 
with little attention to the global political processes within which such operations are 
embedded (Bellamy et al., 2004).  All of these criticisms are in large part apposite to the 
literature that analyses contribution to peacekeeping.    
   
Pugh declares that ‘filling’ the theory gap in peacekeeping analysis is ‘a chief purpose of the 
first issue of [the journal] International Peacekeeping in the next decade’, and notes that there 
are ‘signs of movement and extroversion in the study of peacekeeping / peace operations’ 
(2003:111).  Pugh’s observation is confirmed by the increasingly diverse theoretical 
approaches being directed toward peacekeeping studies, extending to post-structuralist and 
neo-Gramscian analyses, such as those of François Debrix, Oliver Richmond and William I. 
Robinson.  Pugh’s observation is probably most noticeably confirmed by the spring 2004 
issue of International Peacekeeping, that sought to make a concerted effort to push the field 
forward by bundling a variety of recent analyses together, and dubbing them the ‘Next Stage’ 
in peace operations theory.  This bold endeavour is self-consciously styled after Andrew 
Linklater’s celebrated 1992 Millennium article, ‘The Question of the ‘Next Stage’ in 
International Relations Theory’, that sought to mould IR following the sloughing-off of Cold 
War intellectual orthodoxies. 
   
 
 
                           
27 See, inter alia, Paris (2000);  Pugh (2003); Li (2003); Bellamy and Williams (2004a); Bellamy et al. (2004).  
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The ‘Next Stage’ in ‘Peace Operations Theory’ 
 
The exponents of ‘Next Stage’ thinking would like to see the same shift occur in 
peacekeeping scholarship that has occurred in the wider academic field of IR in the closing 
decades of the Cold War.  While ‘Next Stage’ thinking embraces a wide variety of 
approaches, including critical theoretical, post-structuralist, feminist and human security 
concerns – my concern here is to engage principally with the critical theoretical aspect of 
‘Next Stage’ scholarship.  However, in so far as this dissertation embraces the same broadly 
sceptical approach introduced by ‘Next Stage’ thought, it too is part of the same intellectual 
endeavour.    
  
While it would be unwise to impute too much coherence to such a fledging and disparate 
approach, the ‘Next Stage’ is coherent in so far as its adopts Robert Cox’s slogan that ‘theory 
is always for someone or something’ – the celebrated call to recognise the political and social 
embeddedness of intellectual endeavour.  Bellamy, for example, attempts to bifurcate 
peacekeeping scholarship through use of Cox’s problem-solving / critical theory distinction, 
wherein ‘problem-solving’ theory ‘takes the world as it finds it with the prevailing social and 
power relationships and institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for 
action’ (1981:127-128).  Orthodox theory is, therefore, inherently conservative and status-quo 
oriented.  In contrast, by contextualising orthodox theory through the exposure of the social 
basis of knowledge, the emphasis on contingency opens the possibility of change, and 
consequently of social and political transformation. 
 
So how do these concerns affect the study of peacekeeping?  According to Bellamy and 
Williams (2004a), this emphasis on the socially-constructed nature of international politics 
entails viewing international crises as ‘constructed, not discovered, and the relative 
significance attached to particular issues is shaped by factors such as ideology, material 
circumstances, epistemological assumptions and geographical location’ (2004a:8).  The 
problem-solving approach by contrast, envisions intervention in world politics as a temporally 
bound, discrete act with a clear beginning and end.  Consequently, ‘problem-solving theory’ 
is unable ‘to evaluate the extent to which dominant peacekeeping or peacemaking practices 
may actually help reproduce the social structures that cause violent conflict in the first place’ 
(Bellamy, 2004:18).  Even more provocatively, Bellamy suggests that peacekeeping may 
simply be the militarisation of wider relations of interference in domestic societies’: ‘[f]rom a 
critical perspective, the idea that peace operations are discrete activities implies that the 
intervening states and agencies were not already implicated in the crisis they are intervening 
in’ (2004:29).   
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Broadly speaking, the post-structuralist contribution to the ‘Next Stage’ literature has been to 
deliver the insight that peacekeeping operations attempt to reproduce international order 
rather than merely ameliorate crisis.  For critical theorists like Pugh (2004), Bellamy and 
Williams (2004a, 2004b), they draw on political economy to delineate the contours of the 
international order that is being reproduced:    
 
… the dominance of neo-liberal economic theories and the current 
regulation of the global economy (often along distinctly illiberal lines) 
has helped create particular types of war economies, political 
structures, ‘warlordism’ and weak states … peacekeepers themselves 
are also largely constituted by … elements of this broader context 
(Bellamy and Williams, 2004a:8). 
 
Or, more pithily: ‘a critical agenda suggests that the problems that peacekeepers confront 
today are in no small part a reflection of global spending priorities’ (Bellamy and Williams, 
2004b:200).   
 
Global Riot Control 
 
Pugh expands on how peacekeeping operations are embedded in the current global order.  
According to the ‘global riot control’ thesis, neoliberal capitalism bifurcates the world into a 
deeply inter-connected core of advanced capitalist states, and a vast and unstable ‘periphery’, 
unevenly integrated into the global economy, consisting of shadow economies and ‘pseudo 
state-polities’.  This marginalized zone is governed by the ‘core’ from afar, through the 
projection of power in the form of sanctions regimes and NGO network assistance, 
establishing a ‘liberal peace’ – a distinct regime of ‘global governance’, composed of 
neoliberal market economies and political pluralism.  However, when instability ruptures the 
‘periphery’, increasingly aggressive and well-armed peacekeeping operations are deployed to 
suppress the problem.  ‘Thus,’ Pugh writes, ‘modern versions of peacekeeping can be 
considered as forms of riot control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the 
liberal peace’ (2004:41).  In this vein, Pugh notes that so-called ‘peace-support operations’ 
(the conventional term for heavily armed, generally non-UN peace operations, such as the 
NATO-led operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan) are conceptually conceived of as 
counter-insurgency operations, marking a fortuitous synthesis between liberal outrage against 
human rights abuses and an defence of global hierarchy (2004:40).  Together with the 
economic restructuring undertaken by the international financial institutions (IFIs), 
peacekeeping and ‘neoliberal’ economics amount to a potent mixture of ‘poor relief and riot 
control’ (Pugh, 2004:46): 
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Soldiers and humanitarians are trouble-shooters of an international 
society that structures inequalities and fails to fulfil human needs.  
Significantly, too, they replicate the normative and ideological 
assumptions that enable dominant states to manage the system in their 
own image. (Pugh, 2004:54) 
 
According to Pugh, in this world order, the discourse of humanitarianism plays numerous 
roles, functioning both to marginalize ‘structural injustices’, to charge Western public opinion 
for the ‘sacrifice’ of stabilising the ‘periphery’, and to legitimate a new self-other dichotomy 
for the post-Cold War world (2004:49-50).     
 
Evaluating ‘Global Riot Control’: The Aporia of Inter-state Relations  
 
In so far as the ‘Next Stage’ literature seeks to re-politicise peacekeeping studies through an 
attention to issues of ideology and power, it is to be warmly welcomed.  In so far as the 
emphasis on the socially-constructed nature of peacekeeping helps to shift the focus away 
from the target of intervention to the wider international realm, it is also to be welcomed.  In 
so far as the ‘Next Stage’ literature sees the deployment of peacekeeping forces as the sharp 
end of ‘wider relations of interference in domestic societies’, it provides an important 
corrective to the extant literature on intervention, that is frequently blind to the economic 
context of social conflict.  Indeed, simply having consciously set out to introduce a new 
wariness and sceptical approach to the field is perhaps the single most important achievement 
of the ‘Next Stage’.   
 
But, as Neack notes, ‘[e]xpanded scope or not, the UN cannot function without the voluntary 
compliance and full and committed participation of its members’ (emphasis added, 
1995:181).  To the extent that Pugh recognises ‘geographical burden-sharing’ within peace 
operations, he sees this as an attempt by the advanced economies to ease their financial 
burdens, and to avoid risking their soldiers’ lives (2004:45).  In addition the practice of sub-
contracting to ‘coalitions of the willing’ and regional security mechanisms also reflects the 
uneven processes of globalisation – that is, the growing inter-penetration within the core 
regions of the world economy, combined with the exclusion of the peripheral areas  (Pugh, 
2004:43-45).   
 
But, as Neack intimates, the political agency of the participating states is omitted in the 
‘global riot control’ thesis.  I would suggest that this oversight is symptomatic of a more 
general lack in the thesis, and perhaps the ‘Next Stage’ literature as a whole: specifically, the 
inability to grasp the dynamics of inter-state relations.  The end of the Cold War is noticeably 
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absent from an account that remains fixated on ‘neoliberal’ economic policies – though 
neoliberalism can be traced back to the early 1980s of the Thatcher and Reagan period.  
Consequently, ‘global riot control’ makes no effort to incorporate the shift in global relations 
of inter-state power that the demise of the Cold War brought about.  This omission is perhaps 
most tellingly revealed in the very notion of ‘global riots’, evocatively connoting images of an 
undifferentiated, deracinated morass of humanity, with no states, political institutions,  
organisations, nor modes of collective political representation interceding between them on 
the one hand, and the IFIs and their enforcers, the Blue Helmets, on the other.  The dramatic 
diversification of peacekeeping contribution sits ill at ease with claims that conceptualise 
peacekeeping as the military reflex of advanced economies to suppress the epiphenomenal 
manifestations of underlying structural contradictions.  Thus, while global riot control is able 
to question inequalities between people in the ‘core’ and those in the marginalized areas of 
the global economy, it is unable to comment on patterns of inter-state domination.   
 
Bellamy and Williams are ostensibly presenting a radical critique of peacekeeping operations 
as currently conceived, noting that a ‘critical agenda’ in peacekeeping must be sensitive to the 
dangers of ‘becoming a form of neo-imperialism’ (2004b:199) and should also include 
‘advocating for more money to spent on medicines and alleviating malnutrition than on 
marines and mercenaries’:  
 
Encouraging the redirection of resources from the military sector 
towards international development may help reduce the number of 
occasions that peacekeepers are required to engage in political fire-
fighting or global riot control (2004b:200).   
     
But for all the evocative language of ‘global riot control’, critical theory in peacekeeping has 
yet to problematise how the rights of individuals relate to state rights, or how the elevation of 
individual rights may undermine international order.  In the image of deracinated, vulnerable 
humanity, it reproduces the central ideological precept for military intervention in the current 
period: the elevation of individual rights over the rights of states. 
 
Indeed, Bellamy and Williams see the incorporation of the ICISS report’s conclusion 
Responsibility to Protect28 – that intervention should be predicated on the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ rather than the ‘right to intervene’ – as a crucial component of a critical agenda.  This 
shift, they argue, recognises that individual rights and sovereignty are not diametrically 
opposed to each other, and that the historical construction of sovereignty is bound up with the 
                           
28 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
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evolution of individual rights.  In short, Bellamy and Williams fully endorse ‘strengthening 
the military might of the UN’ (2004b:190), conceding that ‘force may be necessary in 
exceptional circumstances’ (2004b:200), in the interests of ‘cosmopolitan law enforcement’. 
But the shift from the ‘right to intervene’ to a focus on the ‘responsibility to protect’ is not 
without its dangers.  As David Chandler notes, while the shift in language from rights to 
responsibilities may bring the ‘victims of world politics’ to the fore (2004:63), it also shifts 
the onus of justification in international law.  Thus, while the UN Charter places the onus of 
justification on those powers perpetrating an intervention, the ‘concept of “sovereignty as 
responsibility” puts the burden of justification on the state intervened in to ‘substantiate its 
‘moral claim to be treated as legitimate’ (Chandler, 2004:65).  The obliviousness to how the 
promotion of individual rights exacerbates inter-state domination within world politics is no 
small oversight, for as Neil Stammers observes ‘the imperative of action to defend human 
rights ironically entails a realpolitik which is highly state-centric and, in fact, not only reflects 
but also reinforces the highly uneven balance of existing power relations’ (Stammers, in 
Chandler, 2002:111).     
 
Through a critique of positivist methodology in peacekeeping, ‘Next Stage’ scholarship is 
seeking to promote a more complex, inter-penetrated ontology as a basis for analysing 
peacekeeping: ‘[c]ritical theories … recognise that interveners and recipients are bound 
together by complex relationships that extend beyond the ostensible limits of the particular 
intervention in question’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2004a:8).  But this denser, ostensibly richer 
ontology also relativises intervention – which is to say, it effectively places the peacekeeper’s 
boots on the firmer ontological ground of ‘complex relationships’, rather than the more 
tenuous, ‘positivistic’ ground of intervention as a discrete, singular act.  The ontology of 
‘complex relationships’ is the counterpart to promoting the ‘responsibility to protect’ over the 
rights of states.  Thus, for all its proclamation of the historical embeddedness of theory, the 
‘Next Stage’ literature nonetheless seems oblivious to the fact that it is effectively serving to 
chisel in philosophical stone a historically contingent set of global power relations that 
emerged from the end of the Cold War.  And it is to these that we must now turn.          
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4. THE RE-ENCHANTMENT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL: 
Legitimacy and the International Sphere 
 
 
One of the most innovative and refreshing aspects of the ‘Next Stage’ literature is its decisive 
refutation of what Bellamy dubbed ‘peacekeeping lore’, namely the notion that the end of the 
Cold War saw the emergence of an explosive ‘New World Disorder’, an image most 
memorably evoked in the lurid and crudely Malthusian language of Robert D. Kaplan (1994), 
but also supported in the pessimistic nostrums of realists such as John Mearsheimer (1990).  
Citing the work of Colin McInnes, Bellamy notes that in between 1986 and 1999, the number 
of conflicts in the world dropped from 25 to 15 (2004:28).  Consequently the only ‘explosion’ 
was that of ‘peace operations and a broadening of their remits’ (ibid).  Thus Bellamy argues 
that instead of attributing the increasing number and complexity of post Cold War 
peacekeeping to changes in the conflict areas themselves, analysts should focus on ‘push’ 
factors instead:  
 
‘[The] proliferation and increased complexity of peace operations 
was a product of changes in the self-perceptions of 
peacekeepers and dominant perspectives on the role of 
peacekeeping in global politics, not an explosion of new types of 
violence in the world’s trouble spots.  As a result, the subject 
matter of peace operations is dictated by the interveners, not the 
targets’ (emphasis added; 2004:28).   
 
What could such ‘push factors’ consist of?  Jennifer Welsh has suggested that the search by 
Western states for new forms of political legitimacy and moral authority to replace the 
ideologically-driven agenda of the Cold War, is a key element underlying the interventions of 
the post Cold War period (Welsh, 2004a:2).  Similarly, David Chandler (2002) has argued 
that what has given both form and content to this search for new modes of authority is the 
protracted crisis of legitimacy within the Western polity – a crisis that has been widely 
commented on elsewhere, but has attracted comparatively little comment in IR.29 
                           
29 Drawing on the research of leading sociologists and political scientists, the Economist captured the basic elements of this 
political malaise that endured throughout the 1990s in what it dubbed the ‘mature democracies’: 
 
In most of the mature democracies, the results [of opinion surveys] show a pattern of 
disillusionment with politicians … Surveys suggest that confidence in political 
institutions is in decline as well. In 11 out of 14 countries, for example, confidence in 
parliament has declined, with especially sharp falls in Canada, Germany, Britain, Sweden 
and the United States […] [T]he evidence of opinion surveys is reinforced by other 
trends. These include a decline both in the membership of political parties and in the 
proportion of people who turn out to vote … (‘Is there a crisis?’ July 15, 1999) 
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It is in this context, argues Chandler, that a premium has been placed on the ability of 
politicians to project unifying values that transcend the traditional, divisive ideologies of left 
and right, and thereby unify the politically-deracinated constituencies of left and right.  It is 
this that, at least partially, makes the moralising claims of human rights so attractive:  
 
In these days of increasing cynicism and doubt over government 
and politics at a domestic level, human rights promotion seems 
to be the one idea with the power to hold society together and 
point a way beyond the relativism and pessimism of our times 
(Chandler, 2002:63)        
 
 
With the demise of Soviet power, the international realm suggests itself as a 
sphere that is far more malleable than the intractable social problems of the 
Western polity.  This contrast between the humdrum sphere of domestic 
politics and the redemptive, morally-charged sphere of the international is 
contrasted by Chandler with subtle hilarity:  
 
The contrast between the moral certainty possible in selected 
areas of foreign policy and the uncertainties of domestic policy 
making was unintentionally highlighted when President George 
Bush congratulated Tony Blair on his willingness to take a stand 
over Afghanistan and Iraq: ‘The thing I admire about this Prime 
Minister is that he doesn’t need a poll or a focus group to 
convince him of the difference between right or wrong.’ 
(emphasis added, Chandler, 2003:138-139).30    
 
 
The reasons for the attraction of the international realm in this pursuit are, according to 
Chandler, twofold.  Firstly, that the object of criticism is external – often a foreign 
government – allows for a Manichean, morally-charged ‘politics of condemnation’.  Second, 
in the international sphere there are less formal mechanisms through which Western states can 
be held to account, offering the intensely tantalising prospect that credit can be claimed for 
positive outcomes, while negative outcomes can be blamed on factors beyond one’s control 
(2002:64-68).  Or, as Füredi pithily observed in 1994: ‘failed politicians who are unable to 
solve the problems of inner-city London or downtown New York feel … much more 
comfortable with handling the situation in Mogadishu with a few helicopter gunships’ 
(1994:114). 
 
                           
30 It is important to note that Western states’ post Cold War foreign policies are not reducible to grubbing for votes.  As Bellamy 
has pointed out ‘there is no evidence to suggest that Clinton lost a single vote because he chose not to prevent or halt the 
Rwandan genocide or that Clinton and Blair gained a single vote because of their activism over Kosovo (2002:131).  The point is 
that this drive is more elemental than mere populism.  Lacking any traditional infusion of legitimacy from the electorate entails 
that ‘the drive to pursue ethical adventures abroad is … directly related to … [a] … basic … instinct of the political establishment 
– the need for governing administrations to have a sense of self-identity, purpose and self-belief’ (Chandler, 2003:137).  
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The ‘Re-Enchantment of the International’ and the Third World 
 
It is in this context that it is perhaps possible to speak of the terms of Martin Wight’s famous 
essay ‘Why is there no International Theory?’ (1966) being inversed.  With the constriction of 
the political terrain between left and right and the advent of ‘Third Way’ social democracy, it 
is the domestic that has become the disenchanted realm, the recalcitrant sphere of ‘recurrence 
and repetition’.  With the end of Soviet power, by contrast, the plasticity of the international 
sphere, for the powerful Western states at least, seems to offer the transformative possibilities 
for the construction of the ‘good life’.  It this dual context – with the domestic realm 
disenchanted and the international realm re-enchanted – that has contributed to the theoretical 
effervescence of academic IR, and helped to consolidate ‘post-positivist’ approaches.  
Whereas ‘rationalist’ approaches emphasised the structural rigidity of the international realm, 
dominated by the operation of necessity and power, ‘perspectivist’ or ‘post-positivist’ theories 
have emphasised context, social construction and contingency – an agenda that directly 
reflects the ostensibly enhanced plasticity of the international realm following the implosion 
of Soviet power.   
 
Ayoob once charged the discipline of security studies with being ‘ethnocentric’ for being 
unable to conceive of security except in terms of external threats.  Consequently the discipline 
was oblivious to the security predicament of the majority of states in the Third World, whose 
institutional and ideological weakness made them vulnerable to internal security threats as 
much as external ones (Ayoob, 1991).  The same charge could arguably be laid at the door of 
many ‘post-positivist’ approaches, including the ‘critical agenda’ of peacekeeping studies:  
critical theoretical approaches have been largely oblivious to how confined and restricted the 
international order has become for non-Western states, quite apart from economic inequalities 
of the global economy.     
 
Sovereignty as Responsibility 
 
What has facilitated the expansion of Western power in the post Cold War era has been the 
international broadening and deepening of the human rights framework – a phenomenon often 
discussed as the emergence of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’.  Conventionally, it is held that a 
series of military operations in the post Cold War era that have been explicitly supported by a 
humanitarian rationale, have juxtaposed sovereignty as authority (the legal right to supreme 
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control over territory) with the nascent ‘norm’ of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (state respect 
for a minimal standard of human rights).     
 
Ayoob argues quite effectively that ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ represents a resurrection of 
the ‘standards of civilization’ argument promulgated by imperialist powers in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, that independence and non-intervention were only fit for states that 
had reached a certain standard of civilization and moral development (2002:83).  Critical in 
this elevation of human rights within international society is the question of agency ‘because’, 
as Ayoob argues, ‘those who define human rights and decree that they have been violated also 
decide when and where intervention to protect such rights should and must take place’ 
(2002:81).  As human rights tend to pre-suppose the diminished capacity of the subjects of 
those rights, this enshrines a degraded notion of political autonomy at the core of world 
politics.  As the content of human rights is established independently of the capacity of the 
subjects of those rights, this contradiction is resolved by yoking in the agency of external 
power: ‘because the human subject is defined as being without autonomy, some external 
source has, of necessity, to be looked to’ (Chandler, 2002:109).   
 
As the inner logic of human rights’ tends to prise apart the subject and agent of rights, in the 
context of global politics the elevation of human rights opens up a rift into which power 
inexorably creeps.  Sympathetically scrutinising Ayoob’s work, Welsh argues that the 
problems raised by human rights include questions such as  ‘[w]ho is it that decides when a 
state has not fulfilled its responsibilities and determines that only force can bring about its 
compliance … [W]ho should play the role of judge and enforcer in international society?’ 
(2004b:66-67).  But the real problem is that these questions answer themselves: in the context 
of gross and massive human rights violations, the question of who is secondary to the moral 
imperative of action.  And in the absence of world government, the imperative of action will 
inevitably be borne by those with the power to act.  In other words, the powerful will always 
be able to assert themselves as the guardians of human rights over the claims of the actual 
subjects of human rights.     
 
Nicholas Wheeler has forcefully argued against referring the rise of ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’ to shifting patterns of global domination.  Wheeler argues that when the UN 
Security Council decided by ten votes with two abstentions on 5 April 1991, to dub the 
refugee crisis within Iraq as a threat to peace, ‘it is hard to resist the conclusion that the 
Council was – albeit tentatively – applying the principle of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ in 
its action …’ (2004:37).  Moreover, when a 26 March 1999 draft Russian resolution 
demanding a halt to NATO’s onslaught on Yugoslavia was ‘comprehensively defeated by 
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twelve votes to three’,31 Wheeler maintains that it is ‘problematic to explain the votes cast by 
Malaysia and Bahrain in terms of the operation of American hegemony as the Cuban 
ambassador argued.  If this was the case, then why did Malaysia and Bahrain feel the need to 
make a public statement rather than remain silent, as was the case with other members like 
Brazil who also cast a vote against the Russian resolution? … The majority of Council 
members … rejected the Russian resolution because they accepted that NATO’s action was 
justifiable on humanitarian grounds.’ (2004:45). 
 
Wheeler contends that the claim that humanitarian ideals have been pressed into the service of 
power does not sufficiently distinguish between power based on relations of domination and 
power based on ‘shared norms’, noting that ‘even repressive governments recognise the need 
to legitimate their actions as being in conformity with global humanitarian values’ (2004:39).  
Moreover, Wheeler points out that there is little evidence to show non-Western states being 
dragooned into compliance: ‘materialists could reply that power does not have to be used to 
be effective, but in the absence of any empirical evidence to support this claim, it remains a 
hypothesis that needs more rigorous testing.  One important piece of evidence that refutes the 
materialist position is that had Western power been as omnipotent as they suggest, would 
Yemen and Zimbabwe have voted against Resolution 688 [5 April 1991]?’ (2004:39). 
 
Methodologically-speaking, Wheeler is on dubious ground here, relying on a blithe positivism 
to demolish alternative interpretations.  On the hand, Wheeler wants it both ways: votes cast 
both for and against ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ resolutions are taken as evidence 
confirming the predetermined conclusion, that power is exercised benignly rather than 
malignantly.  But more significantly, the absence of any record of diplomatic arm-twisting in 
the minutes of UN Security Council meetings is not evidence that diplomatic arm-twisting – 
let alone hegemony – is not at work.  A theoretical framework that is oblivious to the power 
implications of the end of bi-polarity is one that is oblivious to the major fact of international 
politics.  Reflecting on E.H. Carr’s writings, Wheeler muses that ‘[a]lthough the strongest 
states are in a position to substitute brute power for legitimacy, what is surprising is how 
rarely this happens’ (2004:32).  But when Carr argues that ‘supposedly absolute and universal 
principles … [are] but … the unconscious reflexions of … national interest at a particular 
time’ (Carr, in Wheeler, 2004:31), Carr is making the point that ‘brute power’ and legitimacy 
are more often coterminous than antagonistic facets of power.   
                           
31 The Russian resolution, supported by China, Belarus and India, was voted down by the five NATO states on the Council at the 
time (US, UK, France, Canada, the Netherlands) as well as Slovenia, Argentina Brazil, Bahrain, Bahrain, Malaysia, Gabon and 
Gambia.  The Cuban ambassador to the UN subsequently denounced the vote as ‘shameful’, claiming that ‘never before has the 
unipolar order imposed by the USA been so obvious and so disturbing’ (S/PV.3989, in Wheeler, 2004:44). 
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Cross Border Interventions by Developing Countries and Western Power 
 
Commenting on the famous 1986 Foreign Office legal brief that explicitly argued against 
humanitarian intervention, Holbrook argues that in the circumstances of the Cold War what 
vexed the Foreign Office was the possibility of opening up a legal breach for independent 
action on the part of developing states.32  In less than ten years however ‘less powerful states 
had lost their ability to act independently of Western interests.  Saddam Hussein was to 
discover this when Iraqi tanks rolled into Kuwait in 1990 and provoked an international 
response, the likes of which had not been seen in previous decades’ (2002:142).  As Holbrook 
argues, it is ‘now highly unlikely that states like India, Turkey, Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Tanzania could intervene militarily in other states, as they did in [the 1970s], unless they had 
prior Western support …. [now] only the NATO countries … have the political and military 
clout to utilise the newly claimed right [of humanitarian intervention]’ (2002:142).33  Wheeler 
is fond of citing India’s dismemberment of West and East Pakistan (1971), the 1978 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the 1979 Tanzanian invasion of Uganda as the Cold 
War precedents of humanitarian intervention (2002a; 2002b).  But these examples 
inadvertently expose the flaws in Wheeler’s argument, for as Holbrook argues: 
 
Each of these interventions in the affairs of a neighbouring state 
showed that in the bipolar world of the Cold War it was possible 
for a state to use military force independently of Western 
interests.  It was under those circumstances that the Foreign 
Office had reason to fear that a right of humanitarian intervention 
would have given less powerful states a lawful right to wage war. 
(2002:141-142) 
 
If ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ was based on the ‘power of shared norms’, and moreover it 
if it was developing countries that were the harbingers of humanitarian responsibilities during 
the Cold War, it begs the question of why we have not seen more cases of unilateral 
intervention justified in humanitarian terms by developing countries in the post Cold War era.  
Even relatively powerful developing states, such as Russia and Nigeria, have tended to 
conduct regional military interventions through reliance on the legitimacy of regional 
organisation.  The contrast between, say, the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda and the 
deployment of AU peacekeepers to Darfur is particularly striking.  Tanzania was responding 
to repeated border raids by Ugandan forces (Chesterman, 2003:77); in other words, primarily 
out of self-defence.  In Darfur, by contrast, the crisis has been consistently brought to the fore 
by Western diplomacy.  As BBC correspondent Jill McGivering observed some months ago, 
                           
32 ‘[T]he scope for abusing such a right argues strongly against its creation’ (FCO, cited in Holbrook, 2002:140-141) 
33 Holbrook is referring to India’s invasion of East Pakistan (1971); Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus (1974); Indonesia’s annexation 
of East Timor (1975); Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia (1978) and Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda (1979). 
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‘[t]he United States has seemed determined to keep the crisis in … Darfur … high on the 
international agenda in recent weeks … [Colin Powell’s] stern rhetoric also signalled another 
plus point: in the midst of controversy over Iraq, Darfur is an issue on which the US can 
safely assume the moral high ground, with little international opposition.’34  The issue of AU 
peacekeepers has only come forward after a protracted process of Western-led diplomacy.  
The relative arbitrariness of settling on the Darfur crisis is underscored by an observation in 
the Economist: ‘a top Sudanese official admits, the few months of crisis in Darfur have 
tarnished the country’s image more than all the years of war in the south.’35    The marked 
absence of unilateral interventions suggests that developing countries’ ability to act beyond 
the remit of Western power is severely circumscribed.  It is within this context – the inability 
to act beyond the interests of Western power – that the diversification of peacekeeping 
contribution must be understood.  Ayoob has vigorously argued that ‘[a]n ineffective Security 
Council, as in the Cold War era, poses less threat to international society than does a Security 
Council that may routinely become an instrument of one great power or a concert of great 
powers to be used for their own ends’ (1995:127).  The reality of such threats is confirmed by 
MacFarlane and Weiss: 
 
In June 1994, for example, disparate interests resulted in separate 
[Security] Council decisions to authorise interventions by the 
French in Rwanda, the Americans in Haiti, and the Russians in 
Georgia.  Each of the three permanent members traded its vote 
for the favoured intervention of the other in return for support of 
its own favoured operation (MacFarlane and Weiss, in Ayoob, 
2002:87). 
 
Problematising Sovereignty as Responsibility 
 
There a number of corrosive elements to the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’.  Firstly, 
as Ayoob argues, the tendency of human rights militarism is to effectively bifurcate 
international society into two zones, the ‘zones of civilised and uncivilised states’ and to 
‘legitimise predatory actions by the former against the latter’ (2002:84-85).   As Benedict 
Kingsbury observes, what is particularly perverse about this bifurcation is:  
 
[t]heory of liberal and non-liberal zones proposes differential 
treatment … The outcome seems likely to be the maintenance of 
a classificatory system which is itself both an explanation and a 
justification for those at the margins remaining there for 
generations (Kingsbury, in Ayoob, 2002:86)  
 
                           
34 ‘Why is the US focused on Sudan?’ BBC News, 15 July 2004 
35 ‘Decision time in Sudan’, Economist 28 August 2004 
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Secondly, ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ is highly uneven in the burden of responsibility that 
it effectively distributes amongst states.  Chandler notes that the ethereal nature of the 
discourse of human rights abuse is not accidental: ‘human rights abuse[s] … stand outside any 
social, economic or political context and could be applied to the ethnic cleansing of the Native 
Americans in the nineteenth century, to the Nazi Holocaust or civil strife in Sierra Leone’ 
(2002:225).  That is to say that the insubstantial, de-contextualised nature of ‘human rights 
abuse’ allows the discourse to be applied to developing states without cognitive dissonance 
being perceived between the rubric of ‘human rights abuse’ and the fact of being developing 
states.  Thus developing states’ claims to the right of non-intervention, as granted under the 
UN Charter, are put into question by virtue of their being poor, socially fractious and 
institutionally weak.  This tacit – and oftentimes not-so-tacit – questioning of the developing 
state for being a developing state prompted the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, Sir 
Michael Somare, to criticise    
   
the way foreign academics, journalists and governments try to 
determine the fate of small developing countries … The designation of 
the term ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ to a developing nation seems to us to be 
rather arbitrary.  I am concerned there is no clear idea what constitutes 
a ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ state.  Papua New Guinea itself has been designated 
a ‘weak state’ since about 1996 when these ideas came into 
prominence.  The Solomon Island has now been designated as a ‘failed’ 
state. The current [2003 Australian-led] intervention was justified on 
this ground. (Somare, in Gourevitch, 2004:2-3).       
 
 
Yet Papua New Guinea, as well as Tonga and Fiji, obliged by contributing to the 2,250 strong 
Australian-dominated intervention force sent in to the Solomon Islands in July 2003.36 
 
This takes us to the third criticism of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’.  ‘Sovereignty as 
responsibility’ entails more than just a bifurcation of the international order – it also 
necessitates an externalisation of political accountability.  If ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ 
has entailed that the ‘three traditional characteristics of a state … (territory, authority and 
population) have been supplemented by a fourth, respect for human rights’ (Chandler, 
2004:65), then this also involves a shift in accountability, spelled out by ICISS report 
Responsibility to Protect: ‘sovereignty [now] means accountability to two separate 
constituencies: internally, to one’s own population; and internationally, to the community of 
responsible states’ (ICISS, in Chandler, 2004:65).  But the idea of a relativised, qualified 
sovereignty is sheer sophistry, as Chandler points out, ‘a power which is ‘accountable’ to 
another, external body clearly lacks sovereign authority’ (2004:65).  This externalisation of 
                           
36 BBC News, 24 July 2003 
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political accountability needs to be seen in the broader context, in which the accountability of 
the developing state has been gnawed away by a variety of factors – on the economic, policy-
making and political fronts.   
 
On the economic front, ‘[a]t the level of the non-Western state, the human rights approach 
facilitates external regulation by international institutions under the increasingly invasive 
policies of conditionality, which restrict democratic decision-making’ (Chandler, 2002:218).  
In legal terms, as Welsh has noted, the privileging of customary international law on military 
intervention over treaty law and convention, has eroded the basis of international law, mutual 
reciprocity, because reliance on customary law effectively entail that certain types of practice 
are privileged more than others, i.e., the actions of Western states versus the stated opposition 
of non-Western states (2004:55).  The increasing promotion of customary law by particular 
states entails the erosion of universal principles; and ‘[i]f there are no principles to 
international law then international law readily accommodates to the actions of powerful 
states’ (Holbrook, 2002:143).  Chandler follows this process through to its logical conclusion: 
 
As the new forms of international law develop, there is a growing legal 
inequality between the more powerful states and the rest.  Where 
international law is formally subordinate to domestic law in Western 
states, the opposite relationship is developing in the non-Western 
regions (2002:139-140).      
 
In terms of the externalisation of political accountability, the tendency is to extricate political 
decision making from within developing societies, and orient them towards outwards, to the 
‘community of responsible states’, in ICISS jargon.  This is illustrated by the examples of the 
states of south eastern Europe, who present the striking contrast of increasingly involving 
themselves in peacekeeping, while themselves being occupied by multinational peacekeeping 
forces.   
 
The Albanian defence minister Pandeli Majko’s speech to the Albanian peacekeepers being 
deployed to Iraq is particularly revealing in this regard:          
  
By taking part in the coalition of the willing led by the United States 
and the United Kingdom … Albania [has] demonstrated that we were 
up to our duty.   We demonstrated our progress from a country gripped 
by cyclic crises to a country that exports stability and offers means to 
guarantee stability, peace and security. 37 
 
Events over the Albanian village of Lazarat on 18 August 2004 exposed the hollowness of 
these claims to ‘export’ peace and security, when police helicopters of the Italian ‘Interforze’ 
                           
37 Emphasis added, SEES Monitor 14 October 2003 
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mission (stationed in Albania since 1997)38 injured Albanian villagers in an exchange of a 
fire.39  How a state can claim to ‘export peace and security’ when it is incapable of protecting 
its own citizens, and does not maintain the legal monopoly of force throughout its territory, is 
an inconsistency that the ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ argument fails to consider.  Another 
example from the region comes from Serbia: ex-Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Živković was 
so eager to ingratiate himself with the White House during his official visit to the US in July 
2003, that he offered 1,000 troops for peacekeeping operations in Iraq, without any prior 
consultation with the electorate, or concern for the illegality of such an offer under the 
Serbian constitution.40  The move caused even more controversy when it became apparent 
that the ‘peacekeepers’ would be drawn from among 2,000 elite troops dedicated to securing 
the border in Kosovo, where Albanian guerrilla forces continue to operate.41  In the final 
analysis, for poor and weak states ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ means irresponsibility to a 
state’s own citizens.  The externalisation of political accountability entails that foreign policy 
is crafted without reference to the domestic political process – placing policy-making beyond 
the pale of democratic decision-making and accountability.  In Bosnia Herzegovina, the 
government there is determined to submit a multiethnic contingent of de-mining personnel to 
the multinational force in Iraq, in spite of growing domestic opposition.42  As the Bosnian and 
Serbian examples indicate, crafting foreign policy with reference to the priorities of the 
‘international community’ entails the suppression of domestic opposition.          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
38 On 28 March 1997 the Security Council authorised Italy to lead a ‘multinational protection force’ to quell domestic political 
instability in Albania that was seen as constituting ‘a threat to international peace and security’.   
39 ‘Albanian Villagers and Italian Helicopters Exchange Fire’, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 19 August 2004.   
40 Economist 21 August 2004 
41 SEES Monitor, 14 October 2003 
42 SEES Monitor, 15 October 2004 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Non-Western states in a Re-Enchanted International Realm 
   
I have argued in this dissertation that, with the dissolution of the Cold War framework of 
international politics, developing states have come under siege on the political, economic, and 
legal fronts.  In particular, through the elevation of the notion of ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’, developing states have increasingly been politically re-oriented, away from 
their domestic citizens and towards international society.  Ayoob has argued that ‘Third 
World state behaviour, whether at the individual or the collective level, is largely determined 
by the insecurity that is aggravated by the overwhelming feeling of vulnerability, if not 
impotence, among its state elites’ (1995:1).  It is through this prism of vulnerability that we 
must view developing countries’ contribution to interventionist practices such as 
peacekeeping.    
 
The elements of the vulnerability of non-Western states in the post Cold War era are many 
and varied.  It is possible, for example, to read the ‘emergent norm’ of humanitarian 
intervention in a different light.  Referring to the disintegration of the USSR, Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia, Ayoob observes that ‘the prompt admission of break-away 
states to the United Nations [has] sent the message to prospective Third World separatists that 
the international community is no longer committed to the maintenance of existing state 
boundaries’ (1995:174).  Moreover, as Weiss et al. note ‘[in the 1990s] a state that was … 
contemplating action that might be found to be a threat to or breach of the peace had to deal 
with the possibility that the UN Security Council would find its action in violation of 
international law and therefore launch some coercive response’ (2004:337).  This threat of 
military intervention was compounded by increasingly invasive bureaucratic regulation: ‘as a 
historical trend, the United Nations is supervising more rights in more states through more 
intrusive measures than ever before’ (Weiss et al., 2004:339).   
 
Perhaps the most powerful way to illustrate the circumstances of non-Western states in the 
post Cold War period is through the words of Bosnian journalist Mufid Memija.  Reflecting 
on his government’s desire to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq, Memija perceptively likened 
the global order to a Brezhnev Doctrine writ large over the developing world: ‘On the one 
hand, [Iraq] shows that the doctrine of limited sovereignty, known from the dark era of the 
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USSR, is again operating in international relations. On the other, this is very unpleasant proof 
of the subject-like mentality of our politicians’.43     
 
Many commentators have noticed the irony that a Labour government has taken Britain to 
war more times in its two terms of office than previous British governments in the last fifty 
years (e.g., Kampfner, 2004).  Chandler has also pointed out that it is liberals, social 
democrats and former Cold War peace activists that have taken over from conservatives as the 
leading exponents of military force in world affairs – Mary Kaldor and former Labour leader 
Michael Foot being notable examples  (2002:157).  The privileging of human rights concerns 
in world politics, Chandler grimly concludes, has helped to create an international order 
where conflict is more likely, peace negotiations may be undermined and ‘the “scourge of 
war” is no longer seen as the worst outcome of international policy’ (2002:166).       
 
But, as I have been trying to convey in this dissertation, it is not merely the social democrats 
and leftists of Northern states who have contributed to this militarisation of international 
affairs.  It is, for example, the leader of Brazil’s Workers’ Party, Luis Ignácio Lula de Silva 
(‘Lula’), who is responsible for Brazil’s largest military deployment abroad since 1945, 
namely Brazil’s 1,200-strong troop deployment to the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) earlier this year.  Lula has sought to establish his international credentials 
through sponsoring the ‘World Social Forums’ of the anti-globalisation protestors and NGOs.   
Brazil also famously led the Southern states’ charge (the ‘Group of 21+’) against Northern 
agricultural tariff barriers at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) talks in Cancún, Mexico 
in September 2003.  But for all of Brazil’s self-styled role as spokesperson for the developing 
world, Lula has not let the outmoded politics of non-alignment (notably the practice of non-
intervention) – restrict the development of a ‘muscular’ Brazilian foreign policy.  As the 
Economist observed of Lula’s MINUSTAH contribution:   
 
[i]t is a small force, but of huge symbolic significance … [Brazil] is 
playing a more active role across South America [and] seeking a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. “Brazil has begun to flex 
its muscles as a regional superpower,” says Miguel Díaz of the Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think-
tank.’44  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
43 SEES Monitor 24 July 2004 
44 ‘Brazil’s foreign policy: A giant stirs’ 10 June 2004 
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In this dissertation I have sought to advance a ‘subaltern realist’ perspective on the 
diversification of contribution to peacekeeping – and by extension intervention –  
in international relations.  I criticised the extant literature on peacekeeping contribution, 
noting in particular its failure to account for the international societal elements of 
peacekeeping, that are crucial mediating links in relating peacekeeping contribution to the 
wider role of peacekeeping in global politics.  While welcoming the ‘Next Stage’ scholarship 
for suffusing analysis of peacekeeping with an intellectually-nourishing scepticism, I also 
took ‘Next Stage’ thinking to task for elevating structural inequalities at the expense of inter-
state inequalities, and for failing to sufficiently problematise contemporary practices of 
intervention.   
 
In advancing my own understanding of the diversification of peacekeeping contribution, I 
have argued that Western states have pioneered a new mode of international politics, 
whereby, for Western states the moral authority of statehood derives from the projection of 
unifying values abroad.  For non-Western states, on the other hand, the moral authority of 
statehood is conferred by their actions in response to the pressures of the ‘international 
community’.   As Western states have sought to re-mould the international realm to 
complement the imperative of domestic politics within their own states, the elevation of 
individual rights over the rights of states has tended to call into question the legitimacy of the 
non-Western state.  This has, in turn, helped to institutionalise a shift in political 
accountability, away from the internal citizenry of the non-Western state, and outward toward 
the ‘international community’.  This is the context, I have argued, in which developing 
countries’ contribution to peacekeeping operations needs to be seen: an attempt to re-
establish the moral authority of statehood in the eyes of a transformed international society.  
A key element that united the various strands of this argument is the pivotal role played by 
the end of the Cold War in international politics, as the dissolution of Soviet power also 
sapped the power of developing states.        
 
In closing, I will briefly overview the self-defeating aspects of these attempts by developing 
countries to bolster their legitimacy in the international realm at the expense of their domestic 
political sphere.  As ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ has entailed the demonstration of coercive 
power in defence of human rights abroad, it has, I have argued, contributed to a militarisation 
of international affairs.  By demanding the defence of human rights as a moral obligation 
beyond politics, it has placed a premium on the projection of coercive power across borders.    
The UN sought to establish a world where sovereignty was independent of the inequalities of 
power between states, but as Chandler argues ‘[t]he more the concept of human rights 
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militarism is allowed to gain legitimacy, the greater the inequalities become between the 
enforcing states and the rest of the world’ (2002:187).  In Benedict Kingsbury’s words: 
 
The normative inhibitions associated with sovereignty moderate 
existing inequalities of power between states and provide a 
shield for weak states …  These inequalities will become more 
pronounced if the universal normative understandings 
associated with sovereignty are discarded (Kingsbury, in Ayoob, 
2002:83) 
 
Developing states can never hope to outstrip the coercive power available to Western states.  
As the moral authority of non-Western sovereignty has increasingly been stripped of any 
notion of legal and political self-sufficiency independent of material capacity, so sovereignty 
has become increasingly concentrated into its most elemental form – that of coercive power.    
 
 
 
14,684 words 
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